Formal and informal surveillance systems: how to build bridges? by Desvaux, S. & Figuié, M.
 
 
MURDOCH RESEARCH REPOSITORY 
 
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/10689/     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Desvaux, S. and Figuié, M. (2011) Formal and informal 
surveillance systems: how to build bridges? In: 1st 
International Conference on Animal Health Surveillance 
(ICAHS), 17 - 20 May, Lyon, France. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted. 
 
 
  
Formal and informal surveillance systems: how to build bridges? 
 
S. Desvaux
1*, M. Figuié
2 
1 CIRAD, UR AGIRs, Montpellier, F-34398 France  
2  CIRAD, UMR MOISA, Montpellier, F-34398 France, 
* stephanie.desvaux@cirad.fr  
Keywords:   
Surveillance, influenza, socio-anthropology, Vietnam
Summary 
Within the framework of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) surveillance in Vietnam, interviews were carried 
out with poultry breeders and local animal health operators 
in 2 communes of the Red River Delta (RRD) with a view 
to documenting the circulation of sanitary information 
concerning poultry and the economic and social incentives 
for disseminating or withholding information. The main 
results demonstrate that (1) active “informal” surveillance 
networks exist, (2) the alert levels vary and the measures 
applied by the breeders are myriad and often far-removed 
from the official recommendations and (3) the commune 
veterinarian represents an interface between the formal and 
informal systems.  
 
Introduction 
Against a backdrop of growing emergence or re-emergence 
of sanitary problems, surveillance has become an essential 
tool of international sanitary governance: “without well-
functioning surveillance and reporting systems, we are 
stuck” declared Dr D. Nabarro, United Nations System 
Influenza Coordinator (1), in 2009. In the case of animal 
health, numerous problems are associated to the low level 
of breeders’ participation in the surveillance networks and 
their reluctance to implement recommended biosafety 
measures (2, 3). We thus occasionally call on the social 
sciences to explain this fact based on individual 
perceptions and local cultures. These disciplines are 
nevertheless somewhat unwilling to be made the tools of 
the normative procedures underlying these calls and are 
reluctant to participate in the associated education projects 
(modifying perceptions by means of “awareness”) of social 
groups deemed to be poor implementers of strategies 
defined by the actors of the public area (veterinary 
services, international community etc. in the present case). 
The study presented here is the result of collaboration 
between the fields of socio-anthropology and 
epidemiology. Socio-anthropology, as reflected by the 
works of J.-P. Darré (4) is called upon initially to identify 
the operators’ practices and rules governing these practices 
and to understand the specific rationales underlying them. 
In the context of the present study, it is a question of 
analysing the dynamics at work to assess and confront the 
sanitary risks in a community of breeders. Particular 
attention is paid to the role of sanitary information 
produced and circulating locally. These results are then 
discussed from an epidemiological standpoint: comparing 
the reasoning of the breeders with the rationales of the 
parties responsible for implementing national or 
international surveillance networks.  
In Vietnam, at present, the breeders have to declare cases 
of HPAI (as well as cases of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome – PRRS – and foot and mouth 
disease). These declarations must be made to the commune 
veterinarian who then refers them to the local authorities, 
the communal People’s Committee. From the committee, 
the information has to be sent to the district authorities, and 
then to the provincial authorities and finally to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Theoretically, confirmation of the existence 
of one of these diseases leads to the zone being placed in 
quarantine and the animals may be culled. This action is 
accompanied by compensation measures, officially 
variable over time and place, and for which operational 
implementation is somewhat unclear.  
 
Materials and methods 
Our study examines two communities of breeders on the 
front line of the fight against the emergence of sanitary 
problems: the poultry breeders of two communes in the 
RRD in Vietnam facing HPAI outbreaks. 
The choice of the communes studied was dictated both by 
the importance of poultry breeding in the local production 
systems and by familiarity acquired with farmers and local 
authorities during previous research works. These two 
communes will be referred to as A and B. Commune A, 
highly specialised in poultry breeding, is located in one of 
the provinces early and seriously affected by the H5N1 
virus when it appeared in Vietnam in 2003 and 2004. 
However, since then no outbreak has officially been 
declared in this province. In the province where commune 
B is located, outbreaks have regularly been declared during 
the subsequent epidemic waves. 
The breeders in these communes breed poultry (chickens, 
ducks and Muscovy ducks) by combining different 
production systems (meat, eggs and chicks). While certain 
breeders have relatively “large” farms in the local context 
(more than 500 heads), the vast majority of breeders work 
on a more limited scale (100-400 heads). We eliminated 
from our study families with only a small number of 
poultry primarily intended for home consumption.  
In 2010, we interviewed 19 breeders as well as commune 
veterinarians (private veterinarians with a public mission) 
and veterinary drug sellers working in the areas concerned. 
The interviews dealt with the circulation of sanitary 
information concerning poultry: content of the 
information; method, scope and speed of circulation; actors 
involved; actions triggered as a result of the information 
received; the economic and social incentives for 
disseminating or withholding information and for treating 
animals; the role of the veterinarians, etc. The interviews 
were recorded and a written interview sheet was produced 
for each interview.  
 
  
Result 
Active “informal” surveillance networks  
The first observation from our interviews is that an 
informal sanitary information network exists. The 
information circulating within this network concerns the 
symptoms observed on different farms (mortality, 
diarrhoea, etc.); it does not relate exclusively to poultry but 
also to pigs, common in this area. It also includes technical 
economic information (prices of animals and inputs, 
breeding techniques, etc.). It is shared between neighbours 
and parents, on markets and during encounters with other 
breeders in the veterinary drug store. According to the 
breeders, the volume of sanitary information circulating 
since the appearance of avian influenza has increased. 
What we call here the breeders’ epidemiological territory 
(which we define as the radius within which the 
information is considered useful by the breeder and may 
trigger the implementation of measures on his own farm) is 
nevertheless limited (from 500 m to 3 km). The 
information relating to more remote farms, which 
nevertheless share the same stakeholders for feed or chicks 
supply, do not seem relevant by the breeders interviewed, 
showing that they consider the disease dissemination more 
by proximity than by the value chain. 
The breeders claim to be satisfied by this informal network 
(nature, scope, speed, reliability). They judge the 
information issued from this network more useful than that 
disseminated by the veterinary  services by the 
loudspeakers placed in residential areas and through the 
intermediary of the commune veterinarians because it is 
considered to arrive late and to be too general in nature.  
It is interesting to note that the breeders clearly distinguish 
two types of information: (a) information relating to 
common diseases (for example Newcastle Disease, Ga Ru 
and Gumboro Disease, Gum), which the breeders feel they 
can control (even if they cause numerous deaths) and (b) 
information concerning new diseases or symptoms with 
regard to which the breeders feel powerless to act. PRRS 
falls into this second category. However, while HPAI 
belongs to this category in commune B, this is not the case 
in commune A. How can this be explained? 
 
A variable alert level and differing measures, often far- 
removed from the official recommendations.  
In commune A, breeders mention frequent cases of avian 
influenza among their entourage. These events would 
appear to be a part of the breeders’ routine; they believe 
that they are capable both of clearly identifying HPAI 
cases (in particular due to the speed at which mortalities 
occur) and of coping with them. However, the criteria used 
to identify the disease vary considerably from one person 
to the next. There is no fear of possible consequences for 
human health and the measures taken by the breeders are 
essentially aimed at protecting the health of their animals 
and limiting economic losses: the breeders can thus decide 
to anticipate the date of the booster vaccination against 
avian influenza (the poultry vaccination seems to be 
common practice except in backyard farms), to increase 
disinfection measures in the poultry pens and their 
immediate surroundings and to limit their own movements. 
The animals can also be given vitamins and various 
supplements. However, this information can also trigger 
destocking measures if the animals have a commercial 
value: to avoid potential losses, the farmers sell broilers 
close to their sale weight or laying hens close to the end of 
their production life. Animals which are already infected or 
dead are often sold (to the usual collectors) even if the 
prices are very low. We thus see that numerous measures 
are taken by the breeders (and that, in their own way, they 
act as risk managers), but that the main measure officially 
recommended is not mentioned, i.e. report to the commune 
veterinarian. According to the breeders themselves, they 
feel confident that they can manage this situation, : “with 
experience; we have succeeded until now in controlling the 
extent of the epidemic with outbreaks here and there, so 
there is no need to inform the district or the province” 
explained one breeder. This is even more so the case as 
they consider the public sector veterinarians (including the 
commune veterinarian) to be incompetent. On the other 
hand, the breeders are more willing to consult veterinarians 
in the private sector who give them medicines and advice. 
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the breeders 
concerned are trying to evade administrative authority or 
social control by hiding sanitary events. This is supported 
by two facts: first because, in their own words, it is 
important for breeders to provide each other with 
information in order to be protected and, in any case, it 
would be impossible to hide a massive number of animal 
deaths in the context of very close living conditions of 
Vietnamese villages. Second, because these cases only 
rarely result in the implementation of restrictive measures 
by the authorities. 
In commune B, however, breeders indicate no cases of 
avian influenza other than the last cases officially declared 
in 2007. The breeders therefore have only a very limited 
experience which would explain why avian influenza is 
referred to as a new disease which is dangerous to people 
and with regard to which breeders feel powerless to act. 
The breeders state that in the event of new cases, they 
would immediately inform the commune veterinarian as 
they would not know what to do.  
 
The commune veterinarian, an interface between the 
formal and informal systems 
Despite apparently playing a limited role in the local 
information networks, the commune veterinarians 
nevertheless claim to be well informed of the sanitary 
situation of the farms, in particular via the drug sellers who 
are at the heart of the information circulating within the 
commune and a have no problem about sharing the 
information. So why are there not more control measures 
or official declaration in this commune? In all probability, 
it is the result of economic considerations as the province 
is an important source of poultry and chicks for the capital 
Hanoi and the Northern provinces. The drug seller admits 
that it is important to give the breeders the chance to sell 
their animals before taking the matter to the next level. 
Similarly, the People’s Committee would also appear to 
exercise its own judgement concerning the speed at which 
the information is to be communicated in the official 
network. Furthermore, while the breeders claimed several 
times to be sure of their own diagnoses, the commune  
veterinarians pointed to the fear to launch a false alarm 
which would discredit them in the eyes of their superiors.  
It can therefore be seen that the logic of the commune 
veterinarian, and probably of the local authorities as well, 
is primarily to temporise. This does not enter into conflict 
with the rationale of the breeders. In this way, the 
commune veterinarian has found a compromise between 
the position of the breeders and the demands of the official 
system, acting as an interface between the two. 
 
Discussion 
From an epidemiological point of view, if we consider the 
objective of monitoring and controlling the disease, the 
situation described reveals numerous obstacles to a fully 
operational national HPAI surveillance system in a context 
where the disease has become endemic. 
From the point of view of surveillance, the cases 
recognised as HPAI would appear to take varying forms 
depending on the actors and their experience. It would 
appear that the breeders keep a case definition close to the 
outbreaks experienced before the vaccination starts, 
involving massive and sudden mortalities, and cannot 
imagine that the disease can take a different form among a 
partially immunised population. The epidemiology of the 
disease therefore changes more quickly than the 
knowledge of local breeders. Similarly, in a national 
context which aims to identify and index every case, the 
logical strategy would be to adopt a sufficiently sensitive 
case definition. However, at local level, key actors – the 
commune veterinarians– only trigger an alert when they 
are absolutely sure of their clinical diagnosis, which can 
nevertheless prove to be problematic for this disease in 
certain contexts. 
From the point of view of control, a local body of 
knowledge was quickly created within this breeders’ 
community focussing on the recognition and monitoring of 
outbreaks of what, rightly or wrongly, they associate to 
HPAI. This knowledge, which we could compare to that of 
the experts in order to assess its real efficiency, 
corresponds to a means of managing an endemic disease. 
This is out of step with the crisis management approach 
still applied by the government, in particular in response to 
pressure from the international community (5). This 
discrepancy between control policy, the current 
epidemiology of the disease in certain areas and the vision 
of the local actors hampers the constitution of expert 
knowledge, primarily because the sanitary information 
relating to this disease remains sensitive.  
If the breeders do not necessarily see any interest in 
declaring cases as they feel confident in their management 
approach, do they nevertheless feel any obligation? The 
legal framework governing the incentive or obligation to 
report suspected cases of regulated diseases is a pivotal 
question in a surveillance system. In the case of a 
commune where the disease is no longer exceptional, the 
only incentive to declare a case would appear to be the 
social incentive to inform neighbours so that they can 
protect themselves. It is rarely a question of a legal 
obligation. While it exists and is recognised (the breeders 
know that they are supposed to inform the commune 
veterinarian), the regulatory incentive framework is 
ineffective. However, in the case of commune B where the 
disease is still an exceptional occurrence and the breeders 
have yet to learn how to manage it themselves, the 
commune veterinarian would appear to be the favoured 
contact partner to whom they turn. Consequently, while the 
surveillance system is based on the declaration of specific 
diseases or syndromes, the breeders identify levels of 
“seriousness” and “loss of control” which justify recourse 
to the commune veterinarian and thus to the official 
system. 
Finally, the local objectives do not always appear to 
correspond to the national objectives of the surveillance 
and control system. Locally, it would seem that a balance 
between the economic interests of the commune and the 
control of the disease is reached. The objective being to 
keep the disease to a level considered to be acceptable by 
the operators. Our study was unable to clearly identify this 
level, although it would appear to correspond to outbreaks 
capable of causing high mortality rates but the progression 
of which is contained or diminished. At the central level, 
an accurate estimation of the disease prevalence 
throughout the entire territory is a key element for the 
assessment of control policies. However, local 
management of cases using criteria defined locally gives a 
biased vision of the real epidemiological situation.  
In conclusion, the commune veterinarians, who represent 
the interface of the two systems, must therefore reconcile 
the technical demands of the ministry which they represent 
with the political and economic requirements of the local 
authority (under whose direct control they fall) and with 
the individual rationales of the breeders.  As repositories of 
valuable sanitary information, they should be given more 
responsibility in their role by their technical superiors 
while following a more comprehensive professional 
training with a view to increasing their legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the local operators. 
With regard to the breeders it would appear necessary to 
accompany them in redefining the risk, in particular by 
providing them with more information concerning the 
sanitary risk linked to the value chains. This could thereby 
extend their epidemiological territory and the number of 
operators to whom, professionally speaking, they feel 
committed. 
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